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LAWFARE: TERRORISM & THE COURTS
February 16, 2006
"The public needs and wants to know more information;
Government wants to protect more information," said Jim Rosen, a
journalist for The McClatchy Company at "Lawfare: Terrorism & the
Courts," an event hosted by William Mitchell's National Security Forum.
Mr. Rosen sat on a panel along with United States District Court Judges
Gerald Rosen and John Tunheim. Judges Rosen and Tunheim discussed
the challenges that federal judges face in the handling of classified
information in criminal trials as controlled by the Classified Information
Procedures Act (CIPA).
In Judge Rosen's opinion, there are four main obstacles to hurdle in
a case involving classified information under CIPA: (1) case
management; (2) procedural issues; (3) substantive constitutional issues;
and (4) evidentiary issues. Judge Rosen noted that because of the
differences presented by every case and because there is no instruction
manual to deal with the problems that variability presents, case
management becomes a special concern when a trial will likely involve
classified information. Unfortunately, for the judge and the attorneys
involved, identifying early on the extent to which classified information
will be implicated may not be an easy task. Section 2 of CIPA creates a
procedure for relieving some of the concerns this uncertainty presents by
providing that "any party may move for a pretrial conference to consider
matters relating to classified information that may arise in connection
with the prosecution." Judge Rosen emphasized that, under Section 6 of
CIPA, if counsel fails to move for a pretrial conference it is the duty of
the judge to conduct a hearing to make all determinations concerning the
"use, relevance, or admissibility of classified information that would
otherwise be made during the trial or pretrial proceeding."
Judge Tunheim pointed out that, relating generally to case
management issues, judges have to be cognizant of all the evidence and
need to get "behind the information process." More specifically, he
pointed out several issues a judge and the parties involved need to
address during the pretrial conference. The judge must know whether
the government anticipates using classified information in its case
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against the accused. Second, the judge must determine what to do with
this information during discovery. The judge must also determine
whether his own staff and defense counsel must obtain a security
clearance. Sometimes the information involved is so secret that the
judge may need to secure the information in a Secured Compartmented
Information Facility or "SCIF." This may require greater security (i.e.
alarms, guards) in the judge's chambers, and occasionally throughout the
entire courthouse, before, during, and after review of the classified
information. Finally, Judge Tunheim pointed out that judges in these
trials must remain mindful of the access they can grant to the media
during the proceedings to avoid the unintentional disclosure of any
protected information.
"The court needs to establish clear procedures," said Judge Rosen
regarding his second major concern. Judge Rosen provided a list of
some of the procedures CIPA controls: the prosecution must provide the
court with a privilege log of all classified documents; defense counsel
will typically see generic descriptions of the privileged classified
information, though not the documents themselves; the defense must
disclose any and all arguments, documents, and witnesses which may
involve classified information that it will use in presenting its case; the
government is permitted to propose "substitute evidence" for the
classified information. Judge Rosen noted that often this substitute
evidence, like evidence produced for the privilege log, is not very helpful
to defense counsel because it has been "scrubbed" to a point that erases
its utility. Judge Tunheim said that he remains a strong proponent of the
substitute evidence solution because of his observation that "[the federal
government] drastically over-classiflies] information."
Judge Rosen also identified the government's challenge in
determining when it has redacted sensitive information so that defense
counsel may view documents without discovering any operational secrets
such as intelligence sources and methods. He identified the
government's fear that revealing such information could jeopardize
relations with other countries and its own operatives. However, Judge
Rosen noted, based on Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and
Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972), the government must
produce and disclose all exculpatory evidence to the defense. In addition
to being legally required, the disclosure of exculpatory evidence is also
important in building the appropriate courtroom decorum between
opposing attorneys and between the lawyers and the judges. Judge
Rosen noted that these procedures require time and negotiation to
identify and produce classified information in a manner that meets the
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approval of the government and the defense, complies with statutory
rules, and avoids compromising national security interests.
For his third major concern Judge Rosen noted that it is important to
ensure that all parties honor the constitutional promise of due process.
At the forefront of these issues is the right of the defense to effectively
confront witnesses and put on its case. This means that the defense may
need to investigate sources and methods of intelligence. The government
rarely discloses these aspects of the intelligence community's operations
and such information will almost always qualify for protection under
CIPA. As an example, Judge Rosen explained that the defense counsel
in the Zacharias Moussaoui trial sought exculpatory statements from
detainees held at the Guantanamo Bay facilities. The court denied that
request and the government was allowed to produce "substitute
evidence." Because of the scrubbing problem he noted earlier, Judge
Rosen stated that one is left to question whether "substitute information"
violates the accused's constitutional right to a fair, public trial.
Finally, the panelists addressed other evidentiary issues that may
arise. Judge Rosen noted that the often mundane presentation of a
photograph or document for the purpose of its authentication raises
CIPA-related questions: Were these items obtained through circuitous
means? What is to be done if important probative information from
these items is electronically intercepted? What happens if counsel is
unable to lay foundation? As a practical matter, it is not feasible for the
judge to grant everyone in the courtroom a security clearance. This
practical concern, however, is in tension with the defendant's right to a
fair, public trial. It is also necessary for the judge to have procedures in
place which allow members of the jury to gain access to classified
information. One solution might be to change the forum for these
complicated classified information cases: military tribunal, special
immigration or procedure court, terror court, or special pre-cleared juries
for Article III courts. While Judge Rosen expressed a willingness to
have cases involving classified information tried in alternative fora,
Judge Tunheim argued that the Article III courts are better equipped to




et al.: Lawfare: Terrorism & the Courts
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2007
4
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 33, Iss. 5 [2007], Art. 8
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol33/iss5/8
